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Abstract—Insufficient incentives from the market lead to
threats to generation adequacy. In order to create more steady
investment signals, capacity mechanisms (CMs) are discussed in
many European countries. CMs are discussed to complement
energy-based market designs and ensure long-term generation
adequacy. The introduction of a CM has an impact, both in the
implementing but also in interconnected neighbouring countries.
Hereby, the participation of non-domestic capacity at the CM
through interconnection to enhance generation adequacy is often
only limited or not at all possible. Current discussion is mostly
based on qualitative studies. The possible joint impacts are
discussed applying economic theory and transferred experience
from world-wide implementations. This paper introduces an equi-
librium model that allows for quantitative studies directly aiming
on the possible interaction on interconnected countries with no,
different or equal market designs including CMs. Changing
market settings and increasing interconnection capacities can
be researched to underpin the qualitative discussion. The cross-
border effects are studied that arise if harmonization of CM or
cross-border participation are neglected. A case study simulates
two interconnected countries in a symmetrical set up to trace
down the changes in the results to changes of market design and
interconnection capacity. Results show that the change of market
design in neighbouring countries has a strong impact on domestic
generation adequacy. Increased interconnection capacity can have
counter-intuitive effects on the overall generation adequacy.
Index Terms—capacity mechanism, mixed complementarity
problem, cross-border effect, interconnection
NOMENCLATURE
Sets
t ∈ T Set of time steps
c ∈ C Set of countries
k ∈ K Conventional technologies
j ∈ J RES technologies
Parameters
Vc,k;Vc,j Variable cost of technology k or j
Ic,k Investment cost of technology k
Rc,k Ramping capability of technology k
Ac,j,t Availability of RES technology j at time t
Cc,j Installed capacity of RES technology j
ICc,c Interconnection capacity between two countries
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Ec Elasticity in inverse demand function
f p,ccmc Factor for target price at cCM
f d,ccmc Factor for target capacity demand at cCM
f src Factor for share of SR
P
em(,sr)
c Price cap for different markets
P Tc Target price for cCM
Dc,t Reference demand on energy-based market
PRc Reference price on energy-based market
Variables
dc,t Demand (energy-based)
zc,t Market intervention (energy-based)
βc,t Dual variable of demand (energy-based)
dcrmc Capacity demand at CM
zcrmc Shortage at CM
βcrmc Dual variable of demand at cCM
fc,c,t Flow over the interconnection in time step t
µfc,c,t Marginal value of interconnection capacity
gc,k,t;gc,j,t Generation of technology k or j at time t
cpc,k Installed capacity of technology k
µc,k,t;µc,j,t Marginal value of capacity (energy-based)
ρupc,k,t;ρ
dn
c,k,t Marginal value of flexibility (up- & downward)
cpcrmc,k Capacity of technology k accepted at CM
µcrmc,k Marginal value of capacity at CM
gsrc,t Generation from SR
µsrc,t Marginal value of SR capacity
µcrmc,t Marginal value of demand reduction at dCM
λc,t Hourly price at energy-based market
λcrmc Price at the applicable CM
Glossary
cCM Centralized capacity market
dCM Decentralized capacity market
EOM Energy-only market
SR Strategic reserve
I. INTRODUCTION
The European electricity sector is facing a new challenge.
The integration of renewable energy sources (RES) increases
the shares of intermittent injections. The low marginal cost of
RES, often at zero or below due to subsidies, may threat gener-
ation adequacy both on the short- and long-term. The absence
of new investment in conventional capacity is observable. In
fact, a reduction of power system flexibility due to divestment
of non-profitable existing capacities is ongoing. For example,
although a nuclear phase was announced in Belgium intending
a reduction of 6 GW (peak demand in 2015: 13.8 GW) in the
following 9 years, substantial investments in new dispatchable
generation units have not taken place. To the contrary, gas-fired
power plants announced to decommission because of ageing
and/or their non-profitability. In consequence, the nuclear
phase-out has been postponed to 2022-2025, a strategic reserve
is implemented to keep existing power plants available and
incentives for new gas-fired power plants are discussed [1].
In a well-designed market, both, long-term generation ade-
quacy and short-term reliability have to emerge from market
incentives, i.e., remuneration for energy output, providing
flexibility, or ensuring availability. The remuneration can be
energy- or capacity-based. Energy-based remuneration (in
e/MWh) is most common in current market designs. Capacity-
based remuneration (in e/MW) is realized through CMs. The
introduction of CMs changes the market design from energy-
only markets that were predominant in Europe. The interaction
of CMs and policy targets for RES are modelled and discussed
in [2] and [3]. In future low-carbon power systems, CMs may
offer one possible option to ensure generation adequacy.
CMs are implemented in European countries to help to
achieve national generation adequacy targets. National CMs
may introduce distortion in neighbouring countries and im-
plicit competition between market designs. The objective to
reach an European-wide economically efficient mix might not
be reached due to inefficient investment signals originating
from different market designs [4]. The aim for national genera-
tion adequacy rather than aiming for regional coordination can
significantly hamper potential benefits of an integrated long-
term expansion of the European power system [5]. Therefore,
the possible effects with neighbouring markets makes the
implementation of CM complicated [6]. First results after the
introduction of the GB capacity market show that ignoring
the contribution of interconnectors leads to inefficiencies. It
impedes the harmonization process by weakening the busi-
ness case for interconnectors [7]. A possible coordination of
capacity policies such as implementing a CM and integration
policies including increased transmission capacity is high-
lighted in [8]. The role of the interconnector and market is
shown in a system dynamics model for two countries. Similar
studies on the impact of CMs in interconnected markets
use different modelling approaches. A study on cross-border
effects including a centralized capacity market and a strategic
reserve using agent-based modelling can be found in [9]. The
model focusses on long-term dynamics. An additional study
based on a system dynamics model is presented in [10]. It
includes a detailed discussion on the investment decision and
studies among others also the influence of a price cap and
security margins in the energy-based market.
The research question of this paper is focussed on the in-
teraction of interconnection capacity and changing market de-
signs including a CM. The market design refers to an energy-
only market (EOM) or a possible combination of an energy-
based market and a complementary capacity mechanism (CM).
The considered CMs in this paper are a strategic reserve
(SR), a centralized capacity market (cCM), or a decentralized
capacity market (dCM). The effect of a given market design
on the generation mix, generation adequacy and the economic
efficiency is already researched in [11]. The focus of this paper
is put on market configurations with different market designs
in countries that are interconnected with transmission capacity
used for market harmonization aiming at price convergence on
the energy-based market.
To answer the stated research question, this paper introduces
an equilibrium model that allows for quantitative studies
directly aiming on the possible interaction on interconnected
countries with no, different or equal market design including
CMs. Changing market settings and increasing interconnec-
tion capacities can be researched to underpin the qualitative
discussion. The equilibrium reveals prices for the energy- and
capacity-based market, installed capacities, and indicators on
the generation adequacy such as energy non-served.
Section II briefly introduces the modelled market designs
including the CMs. The transfer into the mathematical formu-
lation is presented in Section III. The case study is introduced
in Section IV. The discussion of results follows in Section V.
Section VI concludes the findings of the paper.
II. MODELLING APPROACH
This section briefly justifies the choice for mixed comple-
mentarity problem (MCP) and introduces the modelled CMs.
A detailed discussion of the different concepts is not in the
scope of the paper. The important elements of the market
designs for the modelling approach are outlined. A more
detailed discussion of the differing CMs is done in [11].
A. Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP)
Mixed complementarity problems (MCPs) can be used to
model energy and network-based markets. Specific applica-
tions of MCPs to model capacity mechanisms can be found
in [11], [12] and [13]. Because of the perfect competition
assumption, same results can be achieved by modelling a cost
minimization if the sloped demand curve are incorporated. The
presented MCP is chosen because the modelling technique
ensures good traceability of results. Direct economic links can
be derived from the mathematical formulation of the different
market designs due to the interpretation of the dual variables.
The interpretation of the dual variables in the discussion of the
model highlights the different revenues to justify generation,
offering capacity to the CM and to invest in the installation
of capacity. For a further relaxation of the perfect competi-
tion assumption, such as modelling risk-averse behaviour, the
presented formulation offers a starting point.
The model is a market equilibrium model. Producers, con-
sumers and the interconnection operator with opposing objec-
tives are incorporated. Generation technologies maximize their
producer surplus, while the demand maximizes its consumer
surplus over different markets. The market participants are
connected via hourly clearings of energy-based markets and
yearly capacity-based markets, if applicable. The flows over
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Figure 1. Overview for different markets (w/o import/export)
the interconnection are optimized to arbitrage the price differ-
ence on the energy-based market between the two connected
countries. The solution of the optimization problem satisfies
the first-order conditions (Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condi-
tions) and reflects the behavioural conditions of all market
participants [14].
B. Modelled Market Designs
In total four different market designs are modelled, namely
an energy-only market (EOM), strategic reserve (SR), a cen-
tralized capacity market (cCM), and a decentralized capacity
market (dCM). The distinguishing parameters are discussed in
what follows.
1) Energy-only market (EOM): In each country, the mod-
elled EOM is defined by an hourly market clearing based on
traded energy (Fig. 1a). This results in an hourly uniform mar-
ket clearing price λc,t. The demand curve is modelled with two
parts. It is partly price elastic. The level of price responsiveness
is defined with a given elasticity Ec, a reference price PRc , and
an initial demand profile Dc,t. The demand is price responsive
until the maximum price P
em
c . If the price reaches the price
cap and the supply is not sufficient, market intervention, i.e., a
partial load shedding, is necessary. The supply is given by the
offered available generation. Additionally, import and export
flows with interconnected countries may occur. If there is
an additional CM implemented, this market is referred to as
energy-based market.
2) Strategic Reserve (SR): A SR is contracted in an addi-
tional market next to the energy-based market (Fig. 1b). The
SR market is defined by a given inelastic demand which is
set as a share of the initial peak demand f src ·max(Dc,t). In
the case study a predetermined share of 10 % is chosen. The
SR contracting in an annual market yields one capacity-based
price λcrmc . The upper limit of the capacity price P
sr
c is set to
twice the Cost of New Entry (CONE), i.e., the annualized fixed
costs of the Peak technology. The supply side is defined by the
offered conventional generation from the domestic generation
technologies. The contracted capacity cpcrmc,j cannot be used on
the energy-based market by the capacity owner any more, but
the SR gsrc,t is activated by the system operator if the price
reaches the price cap P
em
c to avoid otherwise necessary partial
load shedding.
3) Centralized Capacity Market (cCM): In the cCM design,
an additional annual market clearing complements the energy-
based market (Fig. 1c). The demand is set by an authority
based on two factors. The first reference point is given by the
capacity target which is defined as the initial peak demand
max(Dc,t) and the associated target price P Tc equal to the
CONE. The second reference point depends on the two design
parameters f d,ccmc and f
p,ccm
c . The point is set at the minimum
capacity demand f d,ccmc ·max(Dc,t) at which the authority is
willing to pay the maximum price f p,ccmc ·P Tc . The case study
uses the two factors f d,ccmc =0.97 and f
p,ccm
c =2. The supply side
is formed by domestic generation capacity. Each conventional
generators still operates its generating unit on the energy-based
market independent of the contracted capacity to the capacity
market. The decision of activation is only influenced by the
variable cost and the energy-based price.
4) Decentralized Capacity Market (dCM): The dCM is an
additional annual market next to the energy-based market. In
contrast to the other mechanisms, the determination of capacity
demand is linked with consumption at the energy-based mar-
ket. Consumers are obliged to back their peak energy demand
with obligations at the dCM. The volume of obligations is
modelled as the peak consumption on the energy-based market
and therefore only materializes during the model run. The
determination results in a capacity demand which is equal to
the maximum of elastic demand and market intervention at the
energy-based market max(dc,t+zc,t) (Fig. 1d). It is assumed
that consumers are aware of the market mechanism and the
calculation of obligations. Consumers can react to the energy-
based market outcome to reduce peak energy demand and
consequently the capacity demand. This introduces a direct
link between peak demand levels at the energy-based market
and capacity obligations. The price cap P
ccm
c is set to twice
the CONE. The supply side for the obligations is formed
by the domestic generation technologies. Each conventional
generators still operates its generating unit on the energy-based
market independent of the contracted capacity to the capacity
market. The decision of activation is only influenced by the
variable cost and the energy-based price.
III. METHODOLOGY
This section introduces the model assumptions and math-
ematical formulation of the market designs. An elaborate
description of the EOM model is given. The other market
designs are described based on the changes to the equations
compared to the EOM. An overview of the used equations for
each market design is given in Table I. Multiple countries can
be implemented by using the appropriate equations per country
for the chosen market design and incorporate the conditions
for the interconnector. The following model formulation is
presented in [11] and extended for this paper to facilitate
multiple interconnected countries. The formulation of the
primal problems for each market participant is attached in
appendix A
A. Model assumptions
For every market design, perfect competition and perfect
information for all market participants are assumed. The
exercise of market power is not possible. Each technology
and the operator of the interconnector act as price taker. The
information includes the demand profiles and investment costs
for the whole span of simulation. Hence, the future revenues
from the hourly market clearing are known at the time of
investment. A one-time investment decision is taken.
B. Energy-Only Market (EOM)
This section briefly describes the EOM model. The EOM
only incorporates the energy-based market. The reader is
refereed to [12], [13] for a detailed discussion on such a model.
1) Conventional Generation Technologies: Each conven-
tional generation technology is clustered in one producer
indexed by k in each country c. The technologies differ
in variable costs Vc,k, annualized investment cost Ic,k and
ramping rate Rc,k, i.e. flexibility. The objective of a producer
is to maximize its producer surplus, i.e., the difference of
achieved revenues and the minimum required revenues. The
minimum required revenues cover the cost for generation and
investing in capacity. The formulation of the problem in KKT-
condition yields the following constraints:
∀c, k, t : 0 ≤−λc,t + Vc,k + µc,k,t + ρupc,k,t
−ρupc,k,t+1 − ρdnc,k,t + ρdnc,k,t+1 ⊥gc,k,t ≥ 0 (1a)
∀c, k : 0 ≤−
∑
t∈T
[
µc,k,t +Rc,k · (ρupc,k,t + ρdnc,k,t)
]
+Ic,k ⊥cpc,k ≥ 0 (1b)
∀c, k, t : 0 ≤ cpc,k − gc,k,t ⊥µc,k,t ≥ 0 (1c)
∀c, k, t : 0 ≤ gc,k,t-1 − gc,k,t +Rc,k · cpc,k ⊥ρupc,k,t ≥ 0 (1d)
∀c, k, t : 0 ≤ gc,k,t − gc,k,t-1 +Rc,k · cpc,k ⊥ρdnc,k,t ≥ 0 (1e)
Eq. (1a) shows that producers generate electricity if the
hourly price λc,t covers the sum of variable costs (Vc,k), the
scarcity rent µc,k,t and flexibility rents ρ
up
c,k,t, ρ
dn
c,k,t. Installed
capacity is only justified if the fixed costs Ic,k are covered
by sufficient accumulated scarcity rents and flexibility rents
(1b). Eq. (1c)-(1e) represent the capacity and ramping limits
for each conventional technology, with corresponding scarcity
rent and flexibility rents, respectively.
2) Renewable Energy Sources: The RES indexed by c, j
maximize the producer surplus as well. In contrast to the
conventional technologies, only the generation schedule is
determined by the model. The installed capacities are fixed.
The optimization problem is described with the following
KKT-conditions:
∀c, j, t : 0 ≤−λc,t + Vc,j + µc,j,t ⊥gc,j,t ≥ 0 (2a)
∀c, j, t : 0 ≤−gc,j,t +Ac,j,t · Cc,j ⊥µc,j,t ≥ 0 (2b)
RES generate electricity if the hourly price λc,t covers the
variable costs Vc,j and the marginal value of available capacity
µc,j,t (2a). Eq. (2b) shows that the injection is limited by
the installed capacity Cc,j times the hourly availability Ac,j,t,
the underlying solar or wind profile per country. The KKT-
conditions are independent from the market designs.
3) Demand Side of the Market: The demand side decides
on the demand dc,t and regulated market intervention zc,t,
e.g., partial load shedding, if there is not sufficient supply. The
objective is to maximize the consumer surplus. The following
KKT-conditions are derived:
∀c, t : 0 ≤−1/2 · P emc + 1/2 · λc,t + βc,t⊥ dc,t ≥ 0 (3a)
∀c, t : 0 ≤βc,t ⊥ zc,t ≥ 0 (3b)
∀c, t : 0 = dc,t + zc,t − (λt − P 0c,t)/Ec , βc,t ∈ R (3c)
with: P 0c,t = P
R
c /(Ec ·Dc,t), Ec < 0 (3d)
Eq. (3a) and (3b) ensure that the demand level and market
intervention are chosen so that the total consumer surplus is
maximized. The sum of both must be equal to the sloped
demand curve (3c). Two possible outcomes depending on
demand and supply level are possible. If the demand level lies
in the sloped part of the demand curve, the market intervention
is zero. If the suppliable demand is below the minimum
demand achievable by price response, the gap is filled by
market intervention zc,t.
4) Energy Balance: The energy balance represents the
hourly market clearing for country c. Eq. (4) ensures that the
demand dc,t is covered by generation from conventional and
RES generation. The energy balance might also be influence
by imports or exports.
∀c, t :
∑
k∈K
gc,k,t +
∑
j∈J
gc,j,t +
∑
cc∈C
(fcc,c,t − fc,cc,t)
= dc,t, λc,t ∈ R (4)
C. Interconnection between Market Areas
The operator of the interconnection can purchase on the
energy-based market in one country and sell in the inter-
connected other one. The objective is arbitraging the price
difference most optimal with a given interconnection capacity.
Additional investment in capacity is not foreseen for the scope
of the paper but could be implemented. The optimization
problem yields the following constraints:
∀c1, c2, t : 0 ≤−λc2,t + λc1,t + µfc1,c2,t⊥ fc1,c2,t (5)
∀c1, c2, t : 0 ≤ ICc1,c2 − fc1,c2,t ⊥µfc1,c2,t (6)
As a result of a flow fc1,c2,t between two countries, either
prices converge or the interconnection capacity is used fully,
so that the dual variable µfc1,c2,t takes a positive value (6).
The dual variable can be interpreted as congestion rent. In
this case, flows only occur if the price in importing country
c2 covers the price of the exporting country plus this rent (5).
D. Strategic Reserve (SR)
To fit the model for the SR market design, model changes
need to be made for conventional generators and the con-
tracting and activation of SR. A new decision variable for
conventional generators is introduced, namely the capacity
offered to SR cpcrmc,k . The decision on the activation of SR
gsrc,t is taken from the generators.
∀c, k : 0 ≤−
∑
t∈T
[
µc,k,t +Rc,t · (ρupc,k,t + ρdnc,k,t)
]
−µcrmk + Ik ⊥ cpc,k ≥ 0 (7a)
∀c, k : 0 ≤−λcrmc +
∑
t∈T
[
µc,k,t +Rc,k · (ρupc,k,t + ρdnc,k,t)
]
+µcrmc,k ⊥ cpcrmc,k ≥ 0 (7b)
∀c, k, t : 0 ≤ (cpc,k − cpcrmc,k )− gc,k,t ⊥ µc,k,t ≥ 0 (7c)
∀c, k, t : 0 ≤ gc,k,t-1 − gc,k,t
+Rc,k · (cpc,k − cpcrmc,k ) ⊥ ρupc,k,t ≥ 0 (7d)
∀c, k, t : 0 ≤ gc,k,t − gc,k,t-1
+Rc,k · (cpc,k − cpcrmc,k ) ⊥ ρdnc,k,t ≥ 0 (7e)
∀c, k : 0 ≤ cpc,k − cpcrmc,k ⊥ µcrmc,k ≥ 0 (7f)
The condition for generation remains and is given by (1a).
The capacity available for generation and ramping is reduced
by the capacity contracted by the SR cpcrmc,k (7c)-(7e). Capacity
is offered to SR if the capacity price λcrmc equals the sum of
scarcity rents from the capacity limits (7c),(7f) and flexibility
rents (7d),(7e). Eventually, both the rents from energy-based
market and SR have to justify the installation of capacity (7a).
The equations show the interaction of the two markets for the
decision of the conventional generators.
An additional market clearing is introduced (9). The offered
capacity from conventional generators equals the predeter-
mined capacity demand. The demand level is set to the
maximum of Dc,t times a SR sizing factor f src . The marginal
value is the capacity price λcrmc :
∀c, t :
∑
k∈K
gc,k,t +
∑
j∈J
gc,j,t +
∑
cc∈C
(fcc,c,t − fc,cc,t)
+gsrc,t = dc,t , λc,t ∈ R (8)
∀c : 0 =
∑
k∈K
ccrmc,k + z
crm
c − f src ·max(Dc,t), λcrmc ∈ R (9)
The SR contracting and activation is modelled individually.
A price cap for SR is introduced and a price cap approach is
applied:
∀c : 0 ≤P src +
∑
t∈T
µsrc,t − λcrmt ⊥ zcrmc ≥ 0 (10a)
∀c, t : 0 ≤ (P src − δ)− λc,t + µsrc,t ⊥ gsrc,t ≥ 0 (10b)
∀c, t : 0 ≤ f src ·max(Dc,t)− zcrmc − gsrc,t⊥µsrc,t ≥ 0 (10c)
If there is insufficient capacity during SR contracting
(zcrmc >0), the price λ
crm
c reaches the price cap P
sr
c . The SR
activation requires the price at the energy-based market λc,t
to be at its price cap P
em
c . The negligible δ ensures that
SR are activated prior to market intervention zc,t (10b). The
generation from SR is limited by the contracted capacity (10c).
E. Centralized Capacity Market (cCM)
The cCM model requires changes for the conventional
generators and demand side. Similar to the SR model, con-
ventional generators additionally decide on the capacity sold
to the capacity market cpcrmc,k . However, in contrast to SR, the
decision on the generation is not affected. Consequently, the
KKT-conditions for the producers are a mix from the previous
market designs. Eq. (1a),(1c)-(1e) apply for the generation,
capacity limit and ramping. The decision on the installed
capacity and the limitation of offered capacity to the cCM
is taken from the SR model (7a),(7f). The difference is the
missing link of the generation and the capacity offered to
the cCM. Consequently, the offered capacity only has to be
justified by the price at the cCM:
∀c, k : 0 ≤−λcrmc + µcrmc,k ⊥ cpcrmc,k ≥ 0 (11)
A capacity balance representing the cCM market clearing is
added. The capacity market results in a market clearing at the
market price λcrmc :
∀c : 0 =
∑
k∈K
cpcrmc,k − dcrmc , λcrmc ∈ R (12)
The demand side of the cCM is similar to the energy-based
market with a partly sloped demand curve. The shape of the
curve is predetermined. This results in the following:
∀c : (applies for (13a)-(13c))
0 ≤ −1/2 · f p,ccmc · PTc + 1/2 · λcrmc + βcrmc ⊥ dcrmc ≥ 0 (13a)
0 ≤ βcrmc ⊥ zcrmc ≥ 0 (13b)
0 = dcrmc + z
crm
c − (λcrmc − P 0,crmc )/M crmc βcrmc ∈ R (13c)
with M crmc =
((f p,ccmc − 1) · P Tc )
((f d,ccmc − 1) ·max(Dc,t))
and P 0,crmc = P
T
c −M crmc ·max(Dc,t)
Similar to the energy-based market, Eq. (13a) and (13b) ensure
that the demand level dcrmc and market intervention z
crm
c are
chosen so that the consumer surplus is maximized. A market
intervention zcrmc occurs if the supplied capacity is below the
minimum targeted capacity f d,ccmc ·max(Dc,t). In that case, the
price reaches the price cap f p,ccmc · P Tc . Eq. (13c) requires
that the sum of demand and market intervention is equal to
the predetermined inverse demand function. The demand side
for the energy-based demand remains the same and equations
(3a)-(3c) are added.
F. Decentralized Capacity Market (dCM)
The dCM model only differs from the cCM for the demand
side. Hence, the equations for the producers and RES are
unchanged (see Table I). The market clearing of the dCM
requires that the offered capacity is equal to the demand
of obligations dcrmc . Eq. (15a) ensures that the demand of
TABLE I. USED EQUATIONS IN MODELS PER MARKET DESIGN
Type Conventionals RES Demand Side Inter-
connector
Market
EOM (1a)-(1e) (2a)-(2b) (3a)-(3c) (5)-(6) (4)
SR (1a),(7a)-(7f) (2a)-(2b) (3a)-(3c), (5)-(6) (8),(9)
(10a)-(10c)
cCM (1a),(1c)-(1e), (2a)-(2b) (3a)-(3c), (5)-(6) (4),(12)
(7a),(7f),(11) (13a)-(13c)
dCM (1a),(1c)-(1e), (2a)-(2b) (3a)-(3c), (5)-(6) (4),(14)
(7a),(7f),(11) (15a)-(15e)
obligations is larger than the energy-based peak demand and
market intervention if applicable.
∀c : 0 =
∑
k∈K
cpcrmc,k + z
crm
c − dcrmc , λcrmc ∈ R (14)
∀c, t : 0 ≤−dc,t − zc,t + dcrmc ⊥ µcrmc,t ≥ 0 (15a)
If the supply at the dCM is lower than the capacity demand
dcrmc , the gap is filled by a market intervention z
crm
c . The price
for capacity is then set to the price cap P
crm
c (15b).
∀c : 0 ≤P crmc − λcrmc ⊥ zcrmc ≥ 0 (15b)
∀c : 0 ≤λcrmc −
∑
t∈T
µcrmc,t ⊥ d
crm
c ≥ 0 (15c)
The interaction of the dCM with the energy-based market is
also reflected in the conditions for the demand at the energy-
based market:
∀c, t :0 ≤−1/2 · P emc + 1/2 · λc,t + βc,t + µcrmc,t ⊥ dc,t ≥ 0(15d)
∀c, t :0 ≤βc,t + µcrmc,t ⊥ zc,t ≥ 0(15e)
The marginal value from the capacity demand µcrmc,t intro-
duces the link between energy-based market and dCM. If
demand at the energy-based market dc,t is at the maximum, the
marginal value is positive (15d), thus, the increase of consumer
surplus by additional demand is also weighted against the
increase of capacity demand.
IV. CASE STUDY
A case study is done to illustrate the application of the
model on a small scale power system with two interconnected
market areas. The case study is organized in 5 scenarios.
Firstly, the reference scenario is the situation with an EOM
in both countries. Secondly, one country introduces a dCM
to address the problem of generation adequacy. Thirdly, the
other country implements a CM with the decision known of
the other country resulting in 3 more scenarios.
A. Case: Three Country System
The case study applies the model on two identical market
areas, named A and B. The two countries are interconnected
with a given transmission capacity available for exporting
respectively importing energy. Hence, a symmetrical system
is created, so that the model results focus on the changing
market designs. Fig. 2 illustrates the three examined stages.
As reference scenario serves a situation with an EOM in both
A B
Reference Scenario
A B
Scenario 1
dCM
Country B
introduces dCM
A B Scenario 2a
SR
A B Scenario 2b
cCM
A B Scenario 2c
dCM
Country A reacts
Figure 2. States of market design configuration
countries. As the countries are perfectly symmetrical, the size
of the interconnection does not influence the result of the
reference scenario.
Scenario 1 represents a change to the market situation.
Country B introduces a dCM, while country A still organizes
its market as an EOM. As the change of market design in
country B changes the situation in country A, country A
determines the optimal response. The response could include
keeping the EOM (Scen. 1) or also change the market design
to either SR (Scen. 2a), cCM (Scen. 2b) or dCM (Scen. 2c).
For all scenarios, sensitivities on the interconnection capacity
are conducted. This analysis reaches from no interconnection
to an interconnection capacity one third the size of the initial
peak demand.
B. Data Input
The case study uses data from the Belgian system, retrieved
from the Belgian transmission system operator (TSO) Elia
[15]. Demand, wind and solar profiles are taken and equally
applied on both countries. This is an assumption of the case
study to enable the tracing of the model results back to
the change of market design. The generation technologies
are grouped into three groups, namely Base, Mid and Peak.
The technologies differ in their economic parameters, namely
annualized fixed costs (Ic,k) and variable costs (Vc,k), as well
as in their technical flexibility, i.e., the ramping rate (Rc,k).
Similar to the input profiles, the parameters are chosen the
same for both countries. The used input parameters are shown
in Table II. Additionally, two RES technologies are introduced
exogenously. The arbitrarily chosen installed capacities (Cc,j)
for PV and Wind are given in Table II. The demand is assumed
to have a given elasticity of Ec=-0.1 in each country. The
reference price PRc for the demand is calculated for each
individual scenario with inelastic demand (E=∞) [11]. In case
of energy non-served (ENS), the energy non-served is valued
with the maximum market price at the energy-based market,
i.e., 3 000e/MWh, and added to the total cost of the system.
This is a conservative assumptions as the value of lost load is
considered higher which would lead to even more impact of
the ENS on the total cost.
V. RESULTS
The results of the case study are presented along three
indicators. Firstly, the installed capacities give insight on
the shift of capacity due to different market configurations.
Secondly, the flows over the interconnection are examined.
Thirdly, the market configurations are discussed with respect
TABLE II. INPUT PARAMETER FOR MARKET TECHNOLOGIES
Type Vc,k(,j) Ic,k Rc,k Cc,j
[e/MWh] [e/MW.year] [e/MW.20d] [%/h] [MW]
Base 36 179 865.55 9 855.65 20 -
Mid 53 101 095.36 5 539.47 50 -
Peak 76 68 779.16 3 768.72 100 -
PV 0 - - - 5100
Wind 0 - - - 2000
TABLE III. COST PER ENERGY SERVED (ENERGY-BASED) [e/MWH]
Country A Country B
Interconnection IC [MW] Interconnection IC [MW]
0 1500 3000 0 1500 3000
Reference 57.90 57.90 57.90 57.90 57.90 57.90
Scenario 1 57.90 57.91 57.85 49.67 49.73 57.96
Scenario 2a 58.01 58.03 58.09 49.67 49.73 55.56
Scenario 2b 49.67 49.67 49.67 49.67 49.67 49.67
Scenario 2c 49.67 49.67 49.67 49.67 49.67 49.67
to the energy non-served. Finally, a system cost comparison
based on the cost per energy-served is done.
A. Reference Scenario
In the reference scenario the installed capacities and gen-
eration mix are equal for both countries and do not change
with increasing interconnection capacity (Fig. 5). This is due
to the symmetrical design of the case study. Consequently,
the interconnection has no value and there are no flows over
the interconnection (Fig. 3). Moreover, the cost for energy
served is equal in both countries (Table III). As a result, the
total cost (energy-based) (Table IV) are the same, as there are
no capacity-based costs in a scenario with an EOM. In both
countries, the installed capacity is not sufficient to supply the
demand in all time steps. The consequence is energy non-
served (Fig. 4). The resulted energy non-served is relatively
small compared to the total served demand (0.14 %). As the
ENS does not change with the interconnection capacity the
total cost including the cost for ENS (Table IV) are equal for
all interconnection capacities. The total cost including ENS are
highest for B compared to all other scenarios. For country A,
the reference scenario shows the second highest cost, only the
Scenario 1 gives higher costs for consumers in A. The results
of the reference scenario serves as baseline to evaluate the
decision taken to change the market designs in the following
scenarios.
B. Scenario 1
In the following scenario 1, B introduces a dCM which
leads to an opposed change in installed capacities in both
countries. Due to the obligation to back up energy peak
demand by capacity in B, the installed capacity increases in
B. If interconnection is available, the installed capacity in A is
reduced (Fig. 5). This can be explained by the cheaper offered
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Figure 3. Cross-border flows for market configurations
energy on the energy-based market in B because of the com-
plementary remuneration from the dCM. This consequently
leads to cross-border flows from B to A making investment in
A less attractive (Fig. 3). In terms of energy non-served, two
effects can be observed. First, with no or low interconnection,
B solves its problem of energy non-served. For A, the amount
stays unchanged, as both the reduction of installed capacities
and imported energy balance out. Second, if there is a lot
of interconnection capacity, the reduction of capacity in A
outweighs the benefit of cross-border flows and energy non-
served increases again to the observed level of the reference
scenario. Although B introduces a dCM energy non-served
occurs because there is no mechanism in place that prevents
the burden sharing in case of simultaneous peaks. In terms of
total costs the same distinction as for the energy non-served
can be done (Table IV). With no or low interconnection, an
increase of the total cost per energy served for B is observed,
while costs for A stay nearly unchanged compared to the
corresponding reference scenario. The increase in cost for B
originates from the dCM. At same time, the dCM ensures a
reduction the energy non-served. With higher interconnection,
total costs converge again. Shared use of capacity and sharing
of energy non-served can be given as reason. The total cost
including the ENS shows that the situation for A, in which it
relies on a EOM while the interconnected country introduces a
CM, gives the highest costs. Due to the leakage of capacity to
B in case of large interconnection capacity, the ENS is largest
and consequently also the associated costs.
C. Scenario 2a
The scenario 2a introduces SR for A as contrast to the
dCM in B. The installed capacity result in similar capacity
than Scenario 1, with the difference, that the generation mix
of A is extended with the capacity from the SR (Fig. 5). The
price differentials are larger on the energy-based market in the
two countries (Table III), partly due to the activation of the
SR at the maximum market price. Consequently, this leads to
larger cross-border flows (Fig. 3). The problem of energy non-
served could be avoided for both countries (Fig. 4). Only for
the large interconnection capacity, limited energy non-served
occurs in A. This can be interpreted as mismatch of the SR
size. The reduction of capacity due to imported flows could
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Figure 4. Energy non-served for market configurations
be covered by a slightly increased SR volume. Summarized,
the total cost is higher for both countries than in the previous
scenarios, which, again, has to be weighted with the absence
of energy non-served. If the ENS is incorporated in the total
cost (Table IV), this scenario offers the solution with the
lowest cost for A. It is important to note that A strongly relies
on the import from the neighbouring country B. A domestic
generation capacity in A is not ensured.
D. Scenario 2b
As alternative to the introduction of SR, in Scenario 2b,
B introduces a cCM. The generation mix is now linked to
the capacity demand due to the two capacity-based markets
in the countries. The total installed capacity is higher in
A as the capacity demand does not depend on the peak
energy demand (Fig. 5). As consequence, the energy non-
served in both countries is brought to zero (Fig. 4). Costs per
served energy on the energy-based markets are identical for all
interconnection capacities. This can be explained by the cross-
border flows below the interconnection limit that occur and
ensure price convergence on the two countries (Fig. 3). The
reason that there are cross-border flows can be explained by
different generation mixes which originate from the different
market mechanisms, especially, the feedback of the capacity
demand on the energy-based market price with a dCM in B. In
terms of total cost, this scenario leads to the most expensive
solution among the scenarios with CMs in both countries,
mainly due to the highest costs in A due to fixed capacity
demand in the cCM. The costs for B are comparable to the
other scenarios in which a dCM is introduced (Table IV).
However, taken into account the cost for ENS, the scenario
still shows lower costs than the reference scenario with EOM
in both countries.
E. Scenario 2c
The Scenario 2c introduces a symmetric market setting.
Both markets include a dCM. Generation mix and total cost
per energy served are the same for both countries. Similar to
the reference scenario, the interconnection has no additional
value and there are no cross-border flows observable. Energy
non-served does not occur, as sufficient capacity is ensured
in both countries (Fig. 4). In contrast with Scenario 2a, both
TABLE IV. COST PER ENERGY SERVED (ENERGY- & CAPACITY-BASED)
[e/MWH] AND TOTAL COST INCLUDING COST FOR ENS (ENERGY- &
CAPACITY-BASED, ENS) [e/MWH]
Country A Country B
Interconnection IC [MW] Interconnection IC [MW]
0 1500 3000 0 1500 3000
Reference 57.90 57.90 57.90 57.90 57.90 57.90
incl. ENS 62.11 62.11 62.11 62.11 62.11 62.11
Scenario 1 57.90 57.91 57.85 59.95 59.94 57.96
incl. ENS 62.11 62.13 63.73 59.95 59.94 60.50
Scenario 2a 59.08 59.07 59.14 59.95 59.95 58.73
incl. ENS 59.08 59.07 59.24 59.95 59.95 58.73
Scenario 2b 60.46 60.46 60.46 59.95 59.95 59.95
incl. ENS 60.46 60.46 60.46 59.95 59.95 59.95
Scenario 2c 59.95 59.95 59.95 59.95 59.95 59.95
incl. ENS 59.95 59.95 59.95 59.95 59.95 59.95
countries do not rely on the import from the neighbouring
country but sufficient domestic capacity is installed. Compared
to Scenario 2b, the costs are lower due to the higher efficiency
of a dCM than a cCM by implicitly linking energy- and
capacity-based demand.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The qualitative discussion on the introduction of CMs and
their interaction with interconnection capacity needs to be
supported by quantitative studies. The presented equilibrium
model enables the user to model two or more interconnected
countries with the same or different CMs. The case study
serves as a theoretical model application to analyse the cross-
border effects of non-harmonized CMs. It reveals the outcome
in case of lack of harmonization, and absence of either implicit
or explicit cross-border participation.
The paper presents a case study with two identical intercon-
nected countries with reduced presentation of the generation
technologies. The market areas are identical in demand, RES
potential and available technologies. Due to the symmetrical
set up and the simplification on the input parameters, the
changes in the results can be traced down to the change of the
market designs in the 5 different scenarios. Four conclusions
can be extracted exemplary.
Firstly, the impact of changing market designs in neighbour-
ing countries can not be neglected in the assessment towards
generation adequacy in the other country. Cross-border flows
triggered by cheaper energy-based prices in the country with
dCM lead to a reduction of capacity in the interconnected
country. An adequate adaptation of the market design is
required to achieve generation adequacy. Here, two options
for the adapting country exist, namely relying on import or
installation of domestic capacity.
As a second conclusion, the outcome of the chosen options
is linked to the choice of market design. SR avoid the problem
of energy non-served by adding the additionally needed ca-
pacity which can not be covered through imports. In contrast,
dCM and cCM give incentives to install domestic capacity,
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Figure 5. Installed capacities for different market configuration
i.e., capacity within the country neglecting interconnection
capacity.
Thirdly, the model reveals that in situations in which one
country with its market design relies on the import from
the neighbouring country (Scenario 1 & 2a), increased in-
terconnection capacity actually worsens the situation. This
is counter-intuitive to the assumption that increased market
coupling improves the overall situation. In the theoretical
model, the adaptation of the generation mix, namely the
reduction of installed capacity in one country, to the largely
increased interconnection capacity outweighs the impact of
cross-border flows on avoided energy non-served.
Fourthly, the case study contributes to the discussion of
harmonization of CMs. The model results show that the
scenario with the least costs for both countries is a setting
with two different mechanisms (Scenario 2a). If domestic
generation adequacy is chosen as policy goal, a harmonization
of a dCM (Scenario 2c) yields least costs for consumers in
both countries.
The application of the model on the case study with the
theoretical set up is a first step to quantify the interaction
of CM and interconnection. The model can be scaled up to
e.g. an European model with multiple interconnected market
zones investigating the existing market framework or plans
for upcoming implementations for CMs. It offers therefore
a valuable contribution on the discussion of the need for
harmonization of CMs and the role of interconnection in a
setting with different market designs.
In a next step, cross-border participation, i.e., the partici-
pation of non-domestic demand in the CM either directly or
via the interconnector needs to be incorporated to represent
the full extent of the ongoing discussion in the model. The
development towards a model representation of an European
market system has to be the goal to give solid policy advice.
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APPENDIX
The formulation of the individual primal problems for
the market participants and market designs are listed below.
Sections A-D list the primal problems for the conventional
generators, the demand side and the required market balances.
The problem formulations for RES and interconnection capac-
ities are identical for all market designs and given in Section E.
In combination with one formulation of the preceding sections,
these formulation are combined to represent the requested
market models.
A. Energy-only Market
1) Conventional Generators:
max
gc,k,t,cpc,k
∑
t∈T
[
(λc,t − Vc,k) · gc,k,t
]− Ic,k · cpc,k
∀c, k, t : gc,k,t ≤ cpc,k (µc,k,t)
∀c, k, t : gc,k,t ≤ gc,k,t-1 +Rc,k · cpc,k (ρupc,k,t)
∀c, k, t : gc,k,t ≥ gc,k,t-1 −Rc,k · cpc,k (ρdnc,k,t)
2) Demand Side of the Market:
max
dc,t,zc,t
∑
t∈T
[
(P
em
c − λc,t) · Inc,t
+1/2 · (P emc − λc,t) · (dc,t − Inc,t)
]
∀c, t : dc,t + zc,t = (λc,t − P 0c,t)/Ec (βc,t)
with: P 0c,t = P
R
c /(Ec ·Dc,t), Ec < 0
3) Market Balance:
∀c, t :
∑
k∈K
gc,k,t +
∑
j∈J
gc,j,t +
∑
cc∈C
(fcc,c,t − fc,cc,t)
= dc,t (λc,t)
B. Strategic Reserve
1) Conventional Generators:
max
gc,k,t,cpc,k,
cpcrmc,k
∑
t∈T
[
(λc,t − Vc,k) · gc,k,t
]
+λcrmc · cpcrmc,k − Ic,k · cpc,k
∀c, k, t : gc,k,t ≤ (cpc,k − cpcrmc,k ) (µc,k,t)
∀c, k, t : gc,k,t ≤ gc,k,t-1 +Rc,k · (cpc,k − cpcrmc,k ) (ρupc,k,t)
∀c, k, t : gc,k,t ≥ gc,k,t-1 −Rc,k · (cpc,k − cpcrmc,k ) (ρdnc,k,t)
∀c, k : cpcrmc,k ≤ cpc,k (µcrmc,k,t)
2) Demand Side of the Market:
max
dc,t,zc,t,
gsrc,t,z
crm
c
∑
t∈T
[
(P
em
c − λc,t) · Inc,t
+1/2 · (P emc − λc,t) · (dc,t − Inc,t)
+(λc,t − (P emc − δ)) · gsrc,t
]
+(λcrmt − P
sr
c ) · zcrmc
∀c, t : dc,t + zc,t = (λc,t − P 0c,t)/Ec (βc,t)
∀c, t : gsrc,t ≤ f src ·max(Dc,t)− zcrmc (µsrc,t)
3) Market Balances:
∀c, t :
∑
k∈K
gc,k,t +
∑
j∈J
gc,j,t + g
sr
c,t
+
∑
cc∈C
(fcc,c,t − fc,cc,t) = dc,t (λc,t)
∀c :
∑
k∈K
cpcrmc,k + z
crm
c = f
sr
c ·max(Dt) (λcrmc )
C. Centralized Capacity Market
1) Conventional Generators:
max
gc,k,t,cpc,k,
cpcrmc,k
∑
t∈T
[
(λc,t − Vc,k) · gc,k,t
]
+λcrmc · cpcrmc,k − Ic,k · cpc,k
∀c, k, t : gc,k,t ≤ cpc,k (µc,k,t)
∀c, k, t : gc,k,t ≤ gc,k,t-1 +Rc,k · cpc,k (ρupc,k,t)
∀c, k, t : gc,k,t ≥ gc,k,t-1 −Rc,k · cpc,k (ρdnc,k,t)
∀c, k : cpcrmc,k ≤ cpc,k (µcrmc,k,t)
2) Demand Side of the Market:
max
dc,t,zc,t,
dcrmc ,z
crm
c
∑
t∈T
[
(P
em
c − λc,t) · Inc,t
+1/2 · (P emc − λc,t) · (dc,t − Inc,t)
]
+(f p,ccmc · P Tc − λcrmc ) · f d,ccm ·max(Dt)
+1/2 · (f p,ccmc · P Tc − λcrmc )
·(dcrmc − f d,ccm ·max(Dt))
∀c, t : dc,t + zc,t = (λc,t − P 0c,t)/Ec (βc,t)
∀c : dcrmc + zcrmc = (λcrmc − P 0,crmc )/M crm (βcrmc )
3) Market Balances:
∀c, t :
∑
k∈K
gc,k,t +
∑
j∈J
gc,j,t
+
∑
cc∈C
(fcc,c,t − fc,cc,t) = dc,t (λc,t)
∀c :
∑
k∈K
cpcrmc,k = d
crm
c (λ
crm
c )
D. Decentralized Capacity Market
1) Conventional Generators:
max
gc,k,t,cpc,k,
cpcrmc,k
∑
t∈T
[
(λc,t − Vc,k) · gc,k,t
]
+λcrmc · cpcrmc,k − Ic,k · cpc,k
∀c, k, t : gc,k,t ≤ cpc,k (µc,k,t)
∀c, k, t : gc,k,t ≤ gc,k,t-1 +Rc,k · cpc,k (ρupc,k,t)
∀c, k, t : gc,k,t ≥ gc,k,t-1 −Rc,k · cpc,k (ρdnc,k,t)
∀c, k : cpcrmc,k ≤ cpc,k (µcrmc,k,t)
2) Demand Side of the Market:
max
dc,t,zc,t,
dcrmc ,z
crm
c
∑
t∈T
[
(P
em
c − λc,t) · Inc,t
+1/2 · (P emc − λc,t) · (dc,t − Inc,t)
]
+(λcrmc − P
dcm
c ) · zcrmc
−λcrmc · dcrmc
∀c, t : dc,t + zc,t = (λc,t − P 0c,t)/Ec (βc,t)
∀c, t : dc,t + zc,t ≤ dcrmc (µcrmc )
3) Market Balances:
∀c, t :
∑
k∈K
gc,k,t +
∑
j∈J
gc,j,t
+
∑
cc∈C
(fcc,c,t − fc,cc,t) = dc,t (λc,t)
∀c :
∑
k∈K
cpcrmc,k + z
crm
c = d
crm
c (λ
crm
c )
E. Applicable for all Market Models
1) Renewable Energy Sources:
max
gc,j,t
∑
t∈T
[
(λc,t − Vc,j) · gc,j,t
]
∀c, j, t : gc,j,t ≤ Ac,j,t · Cc,j (µc,j,t)
∀c, j, t : gc,j,t ≥ 0
2) Interconnection between Markets Areas:
max
fc,cc,t
∑
t∈T
[
(−λc,t + λcc,t) · fc,cc,t
]
∀c, cc, t : fc,cc,t ≤ ICc,cc (µfc,cc,t)
∀c, cc, t : fc,cc,t ≥ 0
